According the Washington Post article, “As Marja assault progresses, coalition considers challenges in rebuilding area,” dated 20100221, the commanders of the 5000 U.S. Marines inserted into the Marja area of Afghanistan (long standing Taliban stronghold crisscrossed by impassible canals (built by the U.S. after the Soviets left) and center of opium production) expected, based on overhead imagery, to find a functioning local government and police force.
However “…when Marine officers reached the area, they discovered that two-dimensional images can be deceiving. What they had thought was the flat roof of the municipal building turned out to be a concrete foundation, and the police station was a bombed-out schoolhouse.” I worked in military intelligence (yes, oxymoron, I know) many years ago. One tenet we followed then and I assumed, probably erroneously, we followed now is that we should base significant actions on intelligence that can be confirmed by at least two sources.
The U.S. military has been in Afghanistan since 2001. Now, as I stated previously, Marja has been a Taliban stronghold for some time. Presumably it is not an easy area to insert a U.S. intelligence officer or a Special Forces team without detection. Nonetheless, I find it very hard to believe that there was no intelligence on the ground in Marja (human intelligence, HUMINT in the vernacular of the U.S. intel community) that couldn’t verify the status of the local government center or police station. The Marines did not go in there without warning…in fact there was plenty of warning…to give civilians the opportunity to evacuate.
That unfortunately gave the Taliban plenty of opportunity to set a bunch of IED’s to welcome the Marines. What a blast to have you here, eh? Here is the bottom line for me; use multiple sources to verify your intelligence and work with the Afghan government to verify your intelligence. If the mission to Marja had been a secret, and one that had not been shared with the Afghani government to avoid leaks, I could understand this intelligence failure. However, it was not a secret and I find it hard to believe that there was no one on the ground that couldn’t tell the U.S. that what were thought to be functioning organizations, the local government and police force, were in fact shells of their former selves.
As such, an occupation/pacification strategy was initiated based on the false assumption that there was a functioning local government and police force to take the place of the Taliban.
